‘Military support was essential for the success of a politician from 81BC to 31BC.’ How far would you agree with this view?

Since the beginning of this period, 81 BC, military support had aided Pompey in enhancing his reputation as an authoritative leader, on several occasions convincing the Senate to award him proconsular or extraordinary commands. As Appian in the Civil Wars states, ‘war against Mithridates had increased Pompey’s reputation and made him very powerful.’ Pompey’s achievements by 70, having had two triumphs and become consul, though he had not held any political office prior to his appointment, display how far this auctoritas had aided his reputation. In Cicero’s speech Pro Lege Manilia (66 BC), Pompey’s notoriety across the Mediterranean, created because of his success in the Mithridatic and Sertorian campaigns, is emphasised and given as a reason for the law to be passed, granting Pompey even more imperium. This came after the lex Gabinia in 67, which had given Pompey ‘absolute authority’ over countries in Rome’s sphere of influence, ‘two hundred ships’ and ‘fifteen subordinate commanders’ (Plutarch’s Life of Pompey). Arguably, Pompey would have never reached this level of unprecedented power had he not been favoured by Sulla, who labelled him ‘Magnus’ in 82. Yet as it is part of official legislation, it is safe to assume that Plutarch was not exaggerating Pompey’s power, or attempting to glorify his biography’s subject for the sake of his reader’s interest. Furthermore, Pompey had used his military imperium before the lex Gabinia in order to influence the Senate, increasing his military success: in 75, Pompey sent an open letter to the Senate, asking for more financial support in the Sertorian War. This is detailed in Sallust’s Histories, where Pompey threatens that his ‘army, against [his] wishes…will cross to Italy and bring…the whole Spanish war.’ Not only does this highlight how Pompey’s reputation as Sulla’s supporter and his effective actions in Lepidus’ revolt have gained for him military imperium and loyalty, it also shows how this power can hold sway with the Senate. This tactic is similar to Sulla’s, in defeating Marius in the Civil War: having marched his troops unconstitutionally into Rome, he became dictator with the threat of his army hanging over the plebeians. As proposed by P. A. Brunt, ‘Sulla’s example and methods…proved most enduring’. Pompey also threatened the Senate with his army stood outside the pomerium of Rome, demanding a triumph. On the one hand, military support allowed politicians to act unconstitutionally, often resulting in relatively long-term success as politicians (see Pompey’s three decade-long influential presence in Rome). On the other hand, military support can result in the Senate’s distrust; Octavian’s command of Julius Caesar’s legions earned him the disparaging name ‘boy’ (discussed in Cicero’s letters), while Cicero complains that the assassination of Caesar was a ‘good deed, half done’ in his letter of 22 April 44, implying that Mark Antony too ought to have been killed. This implies that Mark Antony, now with great military support, was seen as a threat by the Senate - his descent into combat with Caesar’s assassins suggests that military support was not always beneficial to a politician’s career, especially if they were not supported by the Senate. Military support was advantageous in the earlier part of the period, awarding Pompey and Sulla unprecedented powers; when the Senate had experience of politicians manipulating the constitution with their military support, this changed, and politicians without patrician backing were seen as a threat if they commanded an army.