The development of the Cold War in the years 1945-53 can be accredited to an interplay of various factors as various historians have provided different interpretations. In source 7, Martin McCauley suggests that both the Americans and the Soviets ‘misread’ actions which grew into a vicious cycle of misinterpretations resulting in defensive or responsive action. Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov in source 8 agree with McCauley that there was misinterpretation to a small extent as they state that Stalin ‘overreacted to any perceived threat’ which suggests that he misinterpreted American actions such as the Marshall plan as a threat and reacted with organisations such as Comecon which the Americans misinterpreted as expansionist. However, the source also suggests that it was Stalin who subjected ‘the world to a bloody and protracted war.’ Thomas Paterson challenges this view in source 9 as it suggests that the difference in ideology was a factor as well as the lack of a real global power meant that both countries wanted to fill the vacuum of power with their own ideology. However, the most important factor was misinterpretation as it was inaccurate interpretations of actions that created a vicious cycle as the factors were not enough on their own to develop tension as both countries had been allies which suggests that it was not ideology by itself. Similarly, Stalin saw him actions as defensive whilst the USA saw them as expansionist which would show that superpower misjudgements were the most important factor as they increased the emphasis of the other factors.
The statement in the question is superpower misjudgements which are the idea that each side misinterpreted the actions of the other side and responded with action that was misconceived. This is supported by source 7 as McCauley states that ‘American decision makers misread Soviet security interests in eastern and south Eastern Europe as proof of Soviet expansionism and refused to cooperate.’ The Soviet security interests in Europe included territory that they had taken during the Red Army’s march towards Germany which meant that they had filled the vacuum of power in countries which the Nazis had previously occupied. By putting up Communist governments in countries such as Albania in 1945 and Poland in 1947, the Americans saw the Soviet government as expanding its influence as by 1948, all communist countries bar Yugoslavia took orders from Moscow. Stalin saw these countries as a buffer zone as Russia had been invaded from the West by various forces which meant that Stalin wanted to protect Russia by using surrounding countries as a buffer zone. However, the source shows how Americans perceived these actions to be offensive as they saw the Soviets trying to expand their influence and trying to achieve world revolution which was integral to certain types of Marxists such as Trotsky. This can be categorised as a misinterpretation as Stalin believed in ‘Socialism in one country’ as world revolution was not a priority for him but the Americans were unable to empathise with the Soviets as they had not been invaded since the nineteenth century. Source 8 supports this argument as ‘in response to the Marshall Plan, Stalin began to consolidate a Soviet security zone,’ this suggests that Stalin misinterpreted the Marshall Plan. The Marshall plan can be seen as an attempt to help poor countries yet Stalin saw it as dollar imperialism with America trying to expand its influence and so replied with Comecon which the Americans saw as expansionist and replied with NATO. This shows that superpower misjudgements led to the development of the Cold war as it created a vicious cycle with both countries thinking that the other was trying to spread their own influence. Even though misjudgements is the strongest interpretation it is still possible to criticise the argument as it is unlikely that all of these actions were misjudged as it is probable that some of the judgements were accurate such as Stalin’s buffer zone which he declared to be defensive was expansionist as the USSR did not need to invade seven countries in order to protect the USSR. Therefore whilst superpower misjudgements was important for the development of the Cold war between 1945 and 1953, it is only significant because of the other factors.