‘As soon as Richard Cromwell became Lord Protector, the restoration of the monarchy was inevitable’. Assess the validity of this view. [25 marks]

Without a shadow of a doubt, by the time Richard Cromwell became Lord Protector England’s political system was in disarray and restoration looked possible however it was by no means inevitable by the 3^rd September 1658 when Richard took up office. One might argue that restoration was inevitable by the time Richard Cromwell was made Lord Protector because he had little military experience, was a weak leader, was left with financial burden, lacked control of the army and faced a divided Commons. Then again one might articulate that the return of the monarchy was not even highly likely by the time of George Booth’s Uprising or inevitable following the failure of the Rump Parliament and Committee of Safety. The restoration was not inevitable as soon as Richard Cromwell became Lord Protector but instead it became inevitable following the ‘Declaration of Breda’ because it showed Charles’s willingness to compromise and forge an agreeable settlement in line with Moncks vision. Some might argue that as soon as Richard Cromwell became Lord Protector, the restoration of the monarchy was inevitable and there is a case for this because Richard lacked leadership as well as political and military experience. Richard by the 3^rd of September 1658 had very little experience of politics and had barely been involved in the day-to-day tasks of government during his father’s rule. Richard Cromwell, unlike his father, was not involved in the military and had not fought in any of the Civil Wars which consequently meant that few military leaders such as Lambert respected him which meant his hold over the army was weak. In addition to this, Richard found London daunting as he had previously spent most of his life working as a Justice of the Peace in Hampshire. Following the death of Oliver Cromwell one might argue that Richard was out of his depth and this led to a need for a return to the monarchy. Richard, by the time he had become Lord Protector, was neither supported nor opposed but was a weak political figure and his only past experience had been working as an MP in the First Protectorate Parliament. So, one might argue that Cromwell’s lack of military and political background giving him a rather detached outlook of the political system meant that Restoration was inevitable by the latter months of 1658. Moreover, Richard Cromwell had been left with severe financial difficulties and faced a divided Parliament which one might argue made restoration inevitable. Oliver Cromwell left Richard with England deeply in debt and its accumulated deficit was almost £2.5 million with an annual shortfall of £300,000 by 1659. Beyond this the army were months in arrears with a total shortfall of around £900,000. In short, the financial position which Richard inherited from his father made the army restless and unwilling to follow Richard as a leader which signalled a break down in the Protectorate system which opened the possibility for the restoration to occur. Furthermore, when Richard became Lord Protector he faced, in his first Protectorate Parliament known as the ‘Third protectorate Parliament’, much division from members of the Commons. Richard had been unable to exclude MPs from the Parliament so, it was awash with a diverse range of political opinions including Cromwellians, Republicans such as Sir Arthur Heselrig and army men including John Lambert as well as others with shifting loyalties. Divisions ran deep in the Parliament and Council of State and have often been separated into 2 main groupings, the Protectorate Party and the Commonwealthmen. Opposition still existed from staunch Republicans such as Sir Arthur Heselrig who believed the Protectorate to be too monarchical in its approach. In short, one might argue that as soon as Richard Cromwell became Lord Protector, the restoration of the monarchy was inevitable because of spiralling financial difficulties and a divided Commons. Then again, one might highlight that the restoration was far from inevitable by the time Richard Cromwell became Lord Protector because the monarchy was still not popular among most citizens by August 1659 as exemplified during George Booth’s Uprising. A pro-royalist rising had been planned for August 1659 which had required simultaneous action across England. Uprisings in Surrey, under fanatical Royalist John Mourdant, would be followed by a rising in Oxford and one in Cheshire under George Booth with other smaller risings in the Midlands and West Country. However, support waned and neither the Uprising in Surrey or Oxford materialised leaving just Booth in Cheshire. However, Royalist support was not as strong as Booth had anticipated and his force was met by a local militia as well as an army led by John Lambert which culminated at Booth’s crushing defeat at the Battle of Winnington Bridge on the 19^th August. In short, Booth’s uprising showed some popular support for the restoration of the King and that it was a possibility by August 1659 but by no means was it inevitable, as there was a lack of support from English citizens which demonstrated that the return of the monarchy was not widely wanted. Arguably, the restoration was not even inevitable by the end of December 1659 as there was a clear feeling among the senior figures within the political system that England should not be ruled under monarchy. This is clear in the fact that between the end of the Protectorate Parliament in April 1659 and December 1659 there was three attempts at a settlement. Firstly, it is clear that there was no desire for restoration in the Rump Parliament when John Lambert proposed the Humble Petition and Address of the Officers which proposed a ‘Commonwealth, without a King, single person or House of Lords’. The idea of a settlement of a ‘Commonwealth, without a King’ reinforces the view that during the Rump Parliament restoration was not inevitable. Furthermore, in October 1659, following the dissolution of the Rump, the Committee of Safety, comprising of 23 members from varying civilian and army backgrounds was setup. It remained in power for two months but finally collapsed because the Judicial system began to break down, London witnessed a rise in anarchy and General Monck threatened to march from Scotland in support of the Rump Parliament. However, the existence and dissolution of the Committee of Safety is significant because it reinforces the idea that there was no appetite for restoration by 1659. Its creation highlights how civilian and army members such as Bulstrode Whitelocke, Henry Vane Jr. and John Desborough wanted a settlement which did not involve the monarch. Moreover, when Monck threatened to march on London it was to replace the committee with the Rump rather than the monarch highlighting that even Monck had reservations over the return of the King. So, even by December 1659 the restoration was not inevitable because popular political figures did not want a return of the monarchy. However, it is beyond all doubt, as soon as the Declaration of Breda had been issued on the 4th April 1660 the restoration of the monarchy was inevitable because it highlighted Charles Stuart’s willingness to compromise which signalled a new type of monarchical settlement which was agreeable to the majority. Firstly, George Monck had recommended to Charles that he relocate from Catholic Spain to the Protestant Dutch Republic in order to avoid rumours of a papish plot. Charles complied and relocated, along with his key advisors advisers including Edward Hyde and the Marquis of Ormond. This showed Charles to be willing and highlighted to Monck, as well as those in England, that Charles was a reasonable individual who did not wish to be an absolutist ruler which for many, such as the ‘Presbyterian Knot’, was their biggest reservation with the return of the monarchy. The Declaration of Breda was a document that skilfully covered all the significant topics that would be issues for restoration and showed Charles to be accommodating and aware of the problems facing England. Charles outlined in the declaration that he promised a general pardon for crimes committed during the English Civil War and Interregnum period (except the Regicides, however this was not implicitly stated) as well as accepting religious toleration and the swift payment of arears to the army. These suggestions were in line with Monck’s vision as well as the influential ‘Presbyterian Knot’ which had re-surfaced following the reversal of Prides Purge on the 21 February 1660. In summary, the restoration was not inevitable as soon as Richard Cromwell became Lord Protector but instead it was only until the Declaration of Breda had been received that Charles Stuarts return to the throne was inexorable because it showed Charles to be the leader that they wanted as King. To conclude, as soon as Richard Cromwell became Lord Protector, the restoration of the monarchy was not inevitable which is highlighted in the opposition to the restoration exemplified in the failure of Booth’s Uprising and the continual attempts for a new political system excluding the monarch. Truly, the only point at which the restoration of the monarchy became inevitable was Moncks receival of the Declaration of Breda because it showed Charles to be willing to compromise and far from the ‘absolutist ruler’ which they feared. Therefore, the validity of the view that ‘as soon as Richard Cromwell became Lord Protector, the restoration of the monarchy was inevitable’ is weak because it was only inevitable, just over 18 months later, when Charles proved himself to be a reasonable leader through the Declaration of Breda.