Must consequentialists misunderstand the value of close personal relations?

In our lives, we care particularly about a small, close group of people, and we seem to care about them for their own sake. It also seems that the value of such relationships is central to a good life; we would feel sorry for someone whose life did not include such relationships. Now, a consequentialist is someone who believes that       (C) the ultimate moral aim is that outcomes be as good as possible. Living a consequentialist life driven by (C) seems to preclude these relationships because the outcomes are considered impersonally. Thus, it does not matter for whom the outcomes are outcomes or by whom an action that produces the good outcomes is done. It just matters that the outcomes are outcomes for somebody and that the action is done by somebody. In the consequentialist worldview, it seems that neither the fact that an action would bring about good outcomes for a loved one instead of someone else, nor the fact that an action would be performed just for the sake of a loved one are reasons for action. Therefore (runs the argument) consequentialism seems to be incompatible with a good human life. Briefly, here are two good objections to this view. First, one may make an argument appealing to expected consequences. That is, appeal might be made to the principle that       (CE) the ultimate moral aim is that outcomes be as good as possible in expectation. According to this principle, a consequentialist may argue that, since he knows better his close personal relations, there is less uncertainty about their personal preferences and affairs, and so acting partly in their interests is a good way to act to maximise the total balance of good minus bad outcomes. And so, he may act in accordance with (CE) if he shows a preference for the interests of his close personal relations. Secondly, a consequentialist could adopt what Peter Railton calls 'sophisticated consequentialism'. According to this theory, we can be consequentialists without using a principle like (C) in our moral deliberation. We are allowed to have some other decision-making procedure. However, this decision-making procedure is in turn justified by recourse to C. That is to say, a person is a 'sophisticated consequentialist' if following his own procedure produces better outcomes than following some other decision procedure. In this way, he may genuinely care for his close personal relations while maintaining consequentialism. Whether this decision procedure actually produces the best outcomes is a different matter.