The Conservative victory in 1951 is typically attributed either to the failures of Attlee’s government – devaluation, the Bevanite revolt – or to the achievements of Churchill’s opposition, including Lord Woolton’s reforms and the acceptance of the “post-war consensus”. Yet to limit the debate to these factors neglects the importance of forces beyond the control of either side. Labour can hardly be blamed for the outbreak of the Korean War, which exacerbated the balance of payments crisis; nor can the Conservatives be credited with the Liberal Party’s failure to put forward candidates in many constituencies. The role of chance in historical causation should not be underestimated: even the timing of the election, held early to avoid clashing with a royal visit, influenced the result as Labour were unable to benefit from the economic upswing of the following year. Above all, it must be remembered that Labour actually received the most votes in 1951 – the quirks of the “First Past the Post” system enabled the start of thirteen years of Conservative dominance, and were thus (depending on your perspective) either a stroke of good luck or deeply unfortunate.