In spite of of the Tsar’s reformist intentions, the emancipation of the serfs starting in 1861 produced largely negative effects. Intended to improve the social conditions of peasants and to spur an improvement in the Russian economy, emancipation failed on both counts, whilst also politically alienating land-owning nobles and disappointing reformists.
Socially, the end of serfdom created great hardship for many peasants, who were given inadequate plots of land to farm, generally smaller than before emancipation. With a growing population, this caused increasing land shortages leaving some Russians helpless without shelter during the harsh winters. Moreover, the redemption taxes created a crippling burden for peasants, meaning that they were laiden with poll tax arrears worth more than the land they owned, indepting them for decades. In the long term, the reforms did not meet the needs of ordinary Russians, still far poorer on average than their western European counterparts. This created conditions for revolutionary activity that would gain ground at an increasing rate.
Economically, emancipation provided scant incentive for farming reform. Because surplus crops were partly shared amongst the villagers according to the system laid out by the village council (mir), individuals had little economic motive to farm more efficiently.
Politically, emancipation also caused discontent amongst the land-owning class. The redemption tax paid by ex-serfs to their ex-lords did not ease the debt crisis of the gentry. Before emancipation, two-thirds of the gentry were already mortgaged to banks, and the redemption money simply went towards attempting to pay these debts. This continuing crisis meant that between 1861 and 1905 landowners had sold off 40 percent of their land. The one positive outcome of this phenomenon was the redistribution of land into the hands into a new, richer class of peasant.
In conclusion, it is clear that the emancipation of the serfs created negative social, economic and political conditions in Russia, with few tangible positive outcomes. However, these failures did not prompt Alexander II to change political course; by the early 1860s almost all of the conservatives in the Tsar’s government had been replaced by liberals.