To what extent was personal leadership the most important factor in explaining Napoleon's success?

Within the period 1792-1945 personal leadership played a crucial and often dramatic role in military achievement. This view, advocated famously by Antoine-Henri Jomini, is substantiated by history as the significant ability of leaders like Moltke and Rommel was paramount in their success. However, the impact of state organisation must not be ignored. In the Great War, whilst British generals were being labelled ‘donkeys’ and ‘murderers’, government intervention in the production of supplies and the gearing of society to war saved Britain from the munitions crisis of 1916. This level of state organisation provided the basis for the war victory and crucially gave military leaders significantly more room for error. The same is arguably true of the Second World War. Regarding Napoleon however, it is clear that his unique ability outweighed state planning and resources. At Austerlitz, Napoleon’s victory came against the odds as he was grossly outnumbered and whilst some would pay credit to his subordinates, it is difficult to see a leader of lesser talent achieving such a victory. It must be conceded that much of Napoleon’s efficiency came from his dual authority as head of state and of the military; which gave him greater control over France and her resources. Indeed, Karl von Clausewitz argued that Napoleon was successful as a result of both adept leadership and state preparation. However, his tactics of improvisation and adaptability in many cases overruled his preparation. The mark of a great military leader is their reaction to what cannot be planned for and thus it is clear that personal leadership is the more significant factor in military success in the years 1792-1945. Napoleon, according to his contemporaries, possessed an intense personal magnetism, channelling natural charm and authority. He inspired a loyalty in his men that is almost universally recognised. Wellington even remarked that ‘his presence on the battlefield is worth 40,000 men’. Bonaparte’s own experience as a corporal gave him a keen sense for what motivated the soldier, often promising pay in silver, rather than worthless paper currency, and playing on the prospect of plunder. The army enjoyed its heightened status and Napoleon used propaganda to encourage the image of ‘gallant warriors’. Moreover in addressing his troops it was always ‘we’ who defeated the army. Much of the respect he commanded however, was rooted in his talent for strategy, which prompted Clausewitz to don him the ‘God of War’. His overarching aim was the rapid and total eradication of the enemy, which he would achieve through engineering a decisive encounter. Once the enemy had been routed the cavalry would then lead the pursuit of the enemy, this was often more bloody than the actual battle. In the two-week aftermath of their defeat at Jena-Auerstadt, the Prussian army lost three times as many men as they had in the battle itself. Similarly crucial was Napoleon’s development of the corps system, a series of small self-contained armies of around 30,000, they were able to operate independently and had greater mobility than their opposing counterparts as they lived off the fat of the land. Napoleon’s genius was in coordinating each corps to converge on the battlefield and surround the enemy in an age of limited communication technology. This was shown at Ulm in 1805. Several corps marched over 200 miles to converge on Ulm with precise timing, surrounding the Austrian army and forcing it to surrender. Arguably his greatest victory, in December of the same year, came against an Austrian and Russian coalition at Austerlitz. The corps converged with similar accuracy and Napoleon identified a weak point in the allied front, which he barraged until its breaking point. This latter element, his improvisation on the battle field is perhaps most impressive. Chandler remarked that ‘the ceaseless reconsideration of the situation in light of events was an important facet of Napoleon’s genius’ meaning he was ‘rarely at a loss’. Some historians have suggested the lack of delegation limited his capabilities; however it is clear that his complete personal oversight of every detail allowed for a better reaction to circumstance, such as the appearance of a weak spot in enemy lines. Naturally Napoleon’s leadership is greater when contrasted with that of his opponents. The leaders of their opposition were unable to inspire the same ‘fighting spirit’ possessed by the French, monetary gain being their only motivator. Furthermore the coalitions he faced, at Austerlitz for example, were very loose and often struggled to cooperate. His opposition generally favoured a more rigid structure, which struggled to deal with his ‘reconsideration’ and reaction. Wawro wrote that ‘ Napoleon owed his greatest victories to the incompetence of his enemies, which amplified his own undoubted greatness’. In essence, the weakness of opposition, particularly in earlier battles was significant, but only in allowing his effective leadership to triumph.