“To what extent was the Weimar Constitution the main reason for the Nazi Party’s rise to power”
Paragraphs on Political Change:
Hitler’s emergence as Chancellor of Germany on January 30th, 1933 marked the beginning of the long-awaited ‘National Revolution’ that would precipitate into Nazi dictatorship. While Buckley and other critics of democracy have stated that “Hitler came to power democratically”. This appears to be an unconvincing argument - the political manoeuvring between Hindenburg, Von-Papen and Schleicher known as ‘The Backstairs Intrigue” was more the reason for Hitler’s rise to power. Some historians would argue that the old ‘conservative’ dictatorial right; Hindenburg, who brought Hitler to power in the hope that he could be repressed and used to serve their autocratic interest. As Alan Bullock more rightly argues “Hitler did not seize power; he was jobbed into office by a backstairs intrigue”. In March 1932 the Nazis received only 30 percent of the vote, losing badly to Hindenburg. Evoking the authoritarian powers of Article 48, Hindenburg proclaimed martial law and in hoping to establish a majority government and boost the reputation of the democratic republic, ran two more presidential elections that year. In July the Nazis became the largest party in the Reichstag – supporting Bullock’s argument that the Nazi’s did not ‘seize’ power but achieved a rise in power through electoral success; in which Papen would later use to his advantage. However as the November election came about, the Nazis began to splinter under the excessive exploitation of Article 48 that called so many elections and Nazism appeared to considerably suffer. What Bullock appears to consider is that by 1932 the Nazi’s were not strong enough to claim power and their morale was exhausted; there was not enough money to campaign and continue propaganda programs following the Great Depression in 1929, supporting Davidson argument that the ‘most powerful…’ out of desperation “…turned to Hitler only as a last alternative”. No other conservative option appeared to remain suggesting how much Germany’s economic turmoil motivated political figures to deal with Hitler. In many ways Hitler’s public and political popularity rose as a consequence of the Great Depression illustrating why he was able to gain electoral support despite Germanys deteriorating environment.
Papen had every intention in creating a presidential dictatorship using the conservative majority and boasted that "within two months we will have pushed Hitler so far in the corner that he'll squeak". After being replaced by Schleicher in December, Papen increased efforts to persuade the President that Hitler would be fitting as Chancellor. As Papen recalls, being Hitler’s Vice-Chancellor would effectively help him ‘push’ around and exploit Hitler and the Nazi’s in order to establish his own autocratic government. Papen clearly illustrates his plan of using Hitler, hence showing the importance in how much it helped Hitler come to power. Papen’s boastful account portrays his clear intentions in which he aimed to significantly limit Hitler’s role in the cabinet - ignorant to the fact that instead, he would soon end up in that ‘corner’. Historians have differed when interpreting how much Hindenburg chose to appoint Hitler as Chancellor on his own accord. An account by Hindenburg’s State Secretary, Otto Meissner noted that he “was extremely hesitant until the end of January, to make Hitler Chancellor. He wanted to have Papen again as Chancellor”. Hindenburg had a strong antipathy for ‘that Bohemian corporal’ and was reluctant to welcome Hitler into the cabinet. Meissner further added that “Von Hindenburg stated emphatically that he had to respond to this…with a clear and determined ‘no’ "in which his view suggests that Hindenburg’s dislike for Hitler may have prevented his Chancellorship. The extent to which Meissner’s view reflected Hindenburg’s has to be questioned – as it should be considered, being a supporter of Hitler, Meissner appeared as a witness in the trail of major Nazi War criminals, proposing a clear reason to doubt his account. However Hindenburg’s ‘hesitant’ manner gives further credence that he was perhaps not as oblivious and ignorant as Papen to Hitler’s potential as Chancellor. Von Der Goltz contradicts Meissner, presenting that Hindenburg in fact “did nothing to stop his veneration playing into the hands of the Nazi regime… and willingly participated in the stage-managed shows of unity with Hitler” Goltz argues that Hindenburg in fact ‘willingly’ allowed Hitler to achieve power through exploiting the cabinet and along-side Papen contributed to deploying Hitler a high position. However what should be noted is that the President “was now a tired old man weary of all the intrigue. He seemed ready to give in ”Therefore suggesting that Goltz’s view that Hindenburg really stood firm against Von Papen’s planning is a lot less convincing than the one which suggests that Papen's “political buffoonery helped usher the Third Reich into power by manipulating the elderly President.
