Outline and Explain Moore's Open Question Argument (9 marks)

G.E Moore's Open Question Argument functions as an objection towards naturalist moral realism (also referred to as "naturalism"), which is the belief that moral properties exist objectively within the world as natural properties - that is, a moral property such as "goodness" may be identical to a natural property such as "pleasure giving". The argument is in turn a foundational argument for what Moore termed "non-naturalist moral realism", which is the belief that moral properties do exist objectively within the world, albeit as some form of non-natural property.  Moore first states that when analysing two concepts in terms of each other, if they are identical, then to ask if that if they’re identical indicates a misunderstanding of the concepts involved, and is therefore not a meaningful question. For example, asking a question such as “Are bachelors unmarried men?” would reveal a misunderstanding of the notion of one or both of the identical concepts referred to. The answer, “bachelors are married men”, is a tautology, providing the conceptually competent individual with no new information - this is a closed question. Comparatively, if a question of that format can provide new information and doesn’t betray any conceptual misunderstanding, then it is meaningful, and an open question. From Moore’s perspective, if a moral property were identical with a natural property (e.g. identifying the predicate “is good” as equivalent to a predicate like “is pleasant”), then to ask a question like “this is pleasant, but is it good?” would be a closed question, and hence indicate a conceptual confusion if asked . Yet Moore argues that a competent moral agent can always meaningfully ask if a natural property is good - that is, "is X good?" will always provide valuable information. Whether goodness as a property co-instantiates with a natural property is therefore always a substantial and open question. This is why a statement such as “natural property N is good” is meaningful if true. But if a natural property N (e.g. pleasure) was identical with good (not just co-instantiating with it), then said statement would be a tautology akin to “bachelors are unmarried men”, providing us with no new information and lacking meaning. Yet this is not the case, because the question of goodness remains open. We can therefore conclude that the predicate “is good” cannot have an identical meaning to any naturalistic predicate (e.g. “is pleasurable”). Thus, moral properties are not identical to natural properties.