How effective were the policies of British governments, in the years 1789 to 1812, in controlling popular discontent?
Paragraph 1: Firstly, in terms of ‘how effective’ the policies were in ‘controlling’ popular discontent, it is important to register that different perspectives will lead to different conclusions, with popular radicalism being only nominally dissipated by the policies of the Pittite government. From the point of view of the government, the overt element of ‘discontent’ - that is, the public meetings, distribution of pamphlets in support of the French Revolutionary groups by the London Corresponding Society, and public correspondence between LCS and French Jacobins - was suppressed. The Seditious Meetings Act of 1795 restricted the size of public meetings to 50 persons, while a string of high profile arrests of members of the radical political groups throughout the 1790s and into the 19th century helped inaugurate a view of Pitt the Younger as a repressive authoritarian figure, and one incredibly loyal to King and Country (though most of these individuals were actually released). The Treason Act of 1795 also restricted public debate: this suggests that popular discontent was ‘controlled’ through deterrent and fear of reprisal or accusation of treason, as opposed to the government actually rooting out any pro – Republican and radical tendencies among reform groups such as the LCS. In reality, these groups simply went underground. This is clear from the government’s response to Luddism in 1811-12: the violence of the repression on this occasion was effective, and marked the beginning of a process of brutal suppression of dissent, such as the event at Peterloo in 1819, which recognised the government’s own failure to drown out the prospect of civilian rebellion and radicalism by deterrent alone.
Paragraph 2: Furthermore, the question of ‘controlling popular discontent’ through government policies needs to take into account the way in which the government was also working to curb renegade parliamentary figures, such as Charles James Fox, and the discontent being aroused by his pro- Republican sympathies among popular reform groups. Similarly to civilian organisations, the government effectively sidelined or maligned Fox’s support base, rather than ‘controlling’ him in a direct manner. While Reeves’ Associations were established as a counter to Thomas Paine and the other LCS organisation members, in parliament, Pitt was presenting himself as the loyalist foil to Fox, a libertarian Whig that was thought to be conspiring against the King. Edmund Burke, a parliamentarian with pro- establishment leanings, helped break down the Foxite case for Republicanism through his popular publications on ‘Reflections of the Revolution in France’, where he compared the motivation behind the Foxite Whigs and French Revolutionaries with those who attempted to subvert the Glorious Revolution in 1688, suggesting that protection of Crown and Church were essential to a state’s constitution. This ensuing form of constitutional reform pushed forward by Burke, as opposed to radical change on behalf of Fox, allowed Pitt to become the effective mediator that would protect the country from violent revolution. In this instance, popular radicalism was not ‘controlled’, but received heavy blows, from the Pittite propaganda emanating from within the House of Commons itself, where Foxite Whigs were increasingly branded as radical reactionaries that could not be trusted with governance of the nation.
