Briefly outline the tripartite view of knowledge and explain how a case of a lucky true belief (a Gettier-style problem) can be used to argue against this view.

On a tripartite theory of knowledge, having propositional knowledge consists in having a justified, true belief that a certain proposition obtains. For example, to know that it will rain tomorrow consists, on this view, of having a justified, true belief that it will rain tomorrow. In particular, this view maintains both that (a) justified true belief is necessary for knowledge (i.e. all instances of knowledge are also instances of JTB); and(b) justified true belief is sufficient for knowledge (i.e. any instance of JTB also constitutes an instance of knowledge).  The sorts of examples first put forward by Edmund Gettier purport to challenge the second of these claims; (b). Gettier imagined that a man -Smith - goes for a job interview. Whilst he is waiting in the company reception room, he notices that the only other candidate for the job - Jones - has some change in her pocket. Musingly, Jones forms the belief ‘Jones has some change in her pocket’. Later on, the receptionist informs Smith that the company boss is biased against people whose names begin with 'S', and so he will not get the job. Depressingly, Smith forms the belief ‘Jones is the person who will get the job’. As described, Smith has justification for both of these beliefs, from which he infers the further justified belief that ‘the person who will get the job has some change in their pocket’.  However, the receptionist was actually just making a joke to Smith, when she had already heard that Smith is the person who will get the job. Furthermore, and unbeknownst to Smith, he also has some change in his pocket. Thus, Smith's belief that ‘the person who will get the job has some change in their pocket’ is in fact true; furthermore, Smith is justified in this belief (despite the receptionist’s unprofessional behavior earlier, Smith was still justified in taking their word at the time). Therefore, Smith’s belief that ‘the person who will get the job has some change in their pocket’ is both true and justified. So, we have an instance of justified true belief.  However, Gettier pointed out that we would hardly like to call Smith’s belief an instance of knowledge, because Smith’s belief simply seems ‘too lucky’ to constitute knowledge in this instance. If so, then the second claim (b) of the tripartite view above – that justified true belief is sufficient for knowledge – is false. Thus, Gettier examples challenge the tripartite view by challenging claim (b) specifically.