Explain how one of Gettier’s original counter examples attacks the tripartite view of knowledge.

The traditional philosophical conception of knowledge has consisted of three necessary and sufficient conditions conditions:1.      That P is true – or the truth condition2.      That S believes that P – or the belief condition3.      That S is justified in believing p – or the justification condition
This is otherwise known as the tripartite account of knowledge or that knowledge consists in justified true belief. Gettier in his seminal paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” sought show via two examples why the tripartite account fails to specify all the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge.In his first example, he asks us to imagine two men – Smith and Jones – who are both applying for the same job. Smith has it on good authority, that is to say: justified, in believing that “Jones will get the job” Smith has also observed that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket, which means that “Jones will get the Job” logically entails that the “the man with 10 coins in his pocket will get the job”. Smith recognising this logical entailment and believing the former also comes to believe the latter. However, it turns out that Smith was wrong, he gets the job. Furthermore, unbeknownst to Smith he also had 10 coins in his pocket!
In the case of the first belief, that Smith does not have knowledge is in line with the account of knowledge provided. The belief that “Jones will get the job” is simply false and thus fails to meet the truth condition of our account. However, the second belief entailed by the first “the man with 10 coins in his pocket will get the job” turns out to be true in virtue of Smith’s own 10 coins. However, Smith only arrived at this belief only insofar as he logically deduced it from the false belief. It strikes us that Smith’s justification for the belief - that the first belief entails the second - is unrelated to the truth of that belief. It appears that Smith only arrived a true belief by accident. Nevertheless, it appears to Gettier and to us the tripartite account cannot straightforwardly rule out that Smith does not know “the man with 10 coins in his pocket will get the job” on the three conditions stipulated thus far. Consequently, it appears the tripartite account of knowledge fails to specify all of the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge insofar as it fails to account for our concern to ensure a non-accidental relation between justification and truth.