It cannot be disputed that as Prussian minister-president in the 1860s Bismarck played a pivotal role on the events during the period, however the myth surrounding the idealistic image of him as a ‘blacksmith’ is not an effective description. Bismarck even at the pinnacle of his powers was never able to dictate with comprehensive freedom, and had no party or institutional powerbase to fully support him. Even by securing his position and authority in the constitution, he had also increased the power of the Kaiser, who he was dependant on. Stefan Berger perceptively argues that the idea of a “Bismarckian master plan” crafted by three cautiously planned wars was nothing more than a “nationalist myth”. For example the conflict in 1864 against Denmark was not a result of Bismarck at all, it was initiated by the Danes who violated the invisibility of Schleswig and Holstein. In fact, in 1863 his foreign policy move to support the Russian suppression of a Polish uprising isolated liberal opinion, he also faced difficulties in dealing with Kaiser Wilhelm to attend a conference of German princes, it was only through the Schleswig-Holstein issue that a fortunate safe route could be provided out of a difficult situation. We also see that the ‘Kleindeutschland’ idea of a smaller Germany was only a single option out of many Bismarck considered in the 1860s and he did not follow a consistent path towards this single goal, despite the opposite being stated in his predictably self-justifying memoirs and uncritical early biographies. This lack of direction we can associate here with Bismarck is not conventional with the connotations surrounding a ‘blacksmith’ to whom we would more closely associate with the idea of a clear goal they work for and it involving a great deal of skill. With these shortcomings in mind, it would be better to describe Bismarck as a key figure in uniting Germany, as although he may have lacked a clear strategy and had a good deal of fortune, his role was still significant.