To what extent do at least two texts studied on this module give convincing resolutions to the mind-body problem?

As mentioned above, a way in which resolutions to the mind-body problem are presented in Le Rêve de d’Alembert is by way of philosophical theories. The first part of the text, immediately suggests that the text cannot and will not provide a resolution to the mind-body problem because as D’Alambert admits, we are ‘un être dont je n’ai pas la moindre idée ; un être aussi contradictoire est difficile à admettre’.3 Therefore, this shows the text aims toexplore different resolutions with the first part of the text aiming to discover how matter can attain sensibility, and if it can, as is backed up by Colas Duflo as he asserts ‘ce premier dialogue il s’agit de savoir si l’on peut attribuer la sensibilité à la matière’.4 As a result, the text suggests that human beings exist somewhere but it is impossible to say where exactly and how can an immaterial mind and a material body coexist and affect each other as they do? Therefore, if this sensitivity which is attributed to humans ‘est une qualité générale et essentielle de la matière’ then ‘il faut que la pierre sente.’5 This is very much so a resolution pointing towards a dualistic side of the argument. The suggestion is that both mind and body are separate but at the same time have a distinct impact on each other and as such if sensitivity is a part of all things then surely a stone must also feel as a human does. The text goes on to further this argument with the philosophical theory of animating ‘l’instrument clavecin’.6 The idea presented here is that the harpsichord on its own is just a material body, like the stone, but if one were to somehow attribute a harpsichord with sensitivity and a memory, ‘dites-moi s’il ne saura pas, s’il ne répétera pas de lui-même les airs que vous aurez exécutés sur ses touches’.7 Consequently, the approach is again very dualistic in nature as in essence the argument is that the mind and body are completely separate as a body with no capacity for thought or memory is simply a body but, if we can give it an ability to remember, it becomes a body with an active sensitivity that can think and act based on its memories, which is ‘comme modele de l’animal.’8 Therefore, the resolution to the mind-body problem presented here is to an extent convincing in that the dualistic approach does work in this instance. Nevertheless, if the mind and body are separate, then this does not answer the question of why the body without the mind cannot do the same things and as a result demonstrates the fact that the text aims to explore several, possible resolutions to the mind-body problem, as opposed to giving truly convincing resolutions.