The tripartite definition of knowledge states that knowledge is justified true belief. That is, for an individual, A, to be able to claim that she knows that p is true, p must be true, A must believe that p is true, , and A must be justified in believing that p. This definition held strong since Plato, but it was only challenged in 1963 by Edmund Gettier.Gettier presented cases in which an individual had a justified, true belief, yet she would not be able to claim that she has knowledge of something. For example, as I am looking outside my window, I see what I believe to be my cat sitting on the grass. Thus, I deduce that the proposition "My cat is sitting on the grass outside" is true. However, the cat that I saw is someone else's cat which is very similar to mine. Unbeknownst to me, however, my cat actually is sitting on the grass outside, somewhere where I cannot see it. This fact, accidentally, makes my belief true. Therefore, I formed the belief that my cat is sitting on the grass outside on false grounds. Even though I had a justified, true belief, I cannot claim to have knowledge of the fact that my cat is sitting on the grass outside, as it is only by accident that I can claim to know that. Hence, with his paper, Gettier demonstrated that the tripartite theory of knowledge is not sufficient for knowledge and a fourth component needs to be added. He did not aim to add the fourth component himself, but left it open for other philosophers to do so.