How far does the government’s anti-strike organisation following Red Friday explain the failure of the 1926 General Strike? (20 marks)

The government’s preparation for the General Strike can be seen as early as 1921 after the events of Black Friday. Although Black Friday led to the collapse of the Triple Alliance, it highlighted that a united strike action was a potent tool of enforcement which could threaten the government if allowed to. This led to the Industrial Unrest Committee – later re-branded the Supply & Transport Committee – taking on a more active role by stockpiling resources such as coal, oil and water. It is important to note then, that although Red Friday reinforced the need to amass supplies, the government had been preparing for a strike for years beforehand and so were sufficiently prepared. However, this does not take away from the importance of Red Friday in strengthening the already efficient anti-strike apparatuses in place. Although Stanley Baldwin’s bargaining of a nine-month subsidy of £23 million to support coal miners’ wages was criticised for encouraging revolutionary fever, it offered crucial time for the government to recruit members of the polite society to run the transport links and public services whilst the strike persisted. Indeed, it is estimated that between 300,000 to 500,000 volunteers were recruited, with the large majority working for brief hours or never mobilised. In London for example, out of 114,000 volunteers in May, only 9,500 were given work, thus proving that such was the governments efficiency in recruitment, their reserves of labour exceeded the deprivations caused by the strikes by several times over. Coupled with this was the governments insistance on civil policing. By refraining from militant tactics, the government appeared cool, calm and collected whilst the miners were portrayed to be the aggressors, whom were unnecessarily and selfishly protesting. This not only impeded the impacts of the strike, but also emboldened civil society to support the effort in keeping coal and food supplies flowing. Take Plymouth for example, where 20,000 volunteers unloaded food from two battleships due to strikes in the docks. Therefore, it can be said that Baldwin’s decisions at Red Friday gave the government valuable time to build upon their already efficient anti-strike organisations. The stockpiling of resources, mass recruitment of the public and use of civil policing meant that the General Strike was inconvenient, but not intolerable. 
There is no doubting then that the organisation of the government impeded the success of the General Strike. However, there are also other factors which must be accounted for, most notably the chaotic leadership of the strike. Tensions between unions had been prominent for several years after the events of Black Friday when Ernest Bevin and the railway men refused to cooperate with the miners. Due to natural divisions and individual loyalties within the Unions, a strike could only be impactful if there was absolute solidarity behind the cause. However, whist the government developed after the Red Friday negotiations, the Trade Unions became increasingly divided, as the unions refused to grant powers to the General Council to call a strike as there were levels of distrust. Although the powers were granted to the Council after increasing tensions between miners and owners, it proved that the Trade Unions lacked a strong and stable leadership which could guide the strike. By May, over 1.75 million miners, railway men, engineers and shipbuilders were on strike across the country. Whilst they did share in the cause, it can be argued that there was a lack of sincere belief that wages could be protected, for the refusal of owners to back down showed that their plans for shorter working hours and greater cuts were resolute. The considerable distances between the strikers meant that they were more factions of resistance than a cohesive force organised from central planning. This point is reflected well through the ongoing ‘blackleg’ labour in certain factories and docks, whereby workers would break the strike in favour of receiving their wages. The blackleg labour not only gave the government a spread of resources, but highlighted the failings of the strike in uniting the masses. Clearly, the lack of a central leadership had left some workers disillusioned with the strike and although blackleg labour led to far fewer outputs, it did soften the impact of the strike and allowed the government to maintain their monopoly of power over the workers. Although it is true that without ‘blackleg’ labour the government would still have been able to outlast the strike, it did reflect badly on the leadership of the strike who were unable to unite the masses as gradually, more and more workers returned to the docks, factories and railways. The point may be raised then, that whilst the chaotic leadership of the strike was not as detrimental as the government’s anti-strike action, it did dishearten workers when their fellow colleagues realised the strike to be futile and chose to break away from the cause. Coupled with the government’s administrable efficiency, the strike was destined to capitulate. 
To conclude, the government’s anti-strike organisation following on from Red Friday gives a partial explanation as to why the Great Strike failed. It is true that the government’s response to the strike was the underpinning reason as to why it failed, however the disjointed leadership of the Trade Unions and influence of the media must also be accounted for as reasons for the strikes demise. Therefore, the government’s response is only a partial explanation for the strikes failure.