Can Qualia be accounted for in terms of physical facts?

Nagel's notion of qualia is a subjective and notoriously difficult internal sensation to define. It is factual in the same way the sensations of pain or pleasure, hot or cold, soft or rough are in description. Qualia is the way it feels to be something. The unique experience of the sum of all our sensations, chemical balances, and brain power put together. A physical fact may be that 'oxytocin causes milk to be produced in the breast' but this does not explain or inform the reader about what it is like to breastfeed your child, and to have that mother-baby connection. It is the unique feeling of what it is like to be something. Nagel uses the analogy of a bat to explain. One may know all there is to know about being a bat, how they eat, hunt prey, how they can see using sonar, how they react to certain stimuli and so on. One can know all this factual information, but still not know what it is actually like to feel and be a bat. This is the non-physical, subjective feeling of what it is to be a bat. Thus, it cannot be equated to physical facts.

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