Outline and Explain the Logical and Evidential Problems of Evil for the Existence of God. (30)

The original Problem of Evil is often attributed to the ancient Greek philosopher EPICURUS (341-270BC).
If God can do nothing about the evils in the world, then He is not omnipotent.If He does not see them, He is not omniscient.If He does not care about them, then he is not omni-benevolent.If he is not any and all of these three things, then why call him God?
This argument attacks the existence of the God of classical theism which posits a perfect, omni-benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent God. This is the deity in all the Abrahamic religions- Judaism, Islam and Christianity. The early expression of the problem of evil addresses how God, traditionally conceived, is compatible with His creation in view of its evils. However, the contemporary problem of evil has been divided into two categories- the logical and evidential problems. The logical formulation utilises the logic of defeat, specifically analysing how beliefs about the nature and existence of God can be made logically compatible with beliefs or facts about the existence and nature of evil. J. L. MACKIE, who formulates the problem, concludes that it is insurmountable by using the inconsistent triad to demonstrate the 'logical impossibility and absurdity' of the existence of both God and evil. This takes the form of a triangle where the points 'God is omni-benevolent', 'evil exists' and 'God is omnipotent' cannot exist simultaneously. It is a deductive logical argument, meaning that the the premises provide a guarantee of the truth of the conclusion if they are sound and logically valid. This form of argument is intended to provide certainty because, if the premises provide support for the conclusion and are true, it would be impossible for the conclusion to be false.
In contrast, William Rowe's Evidential Formulation of the Problem of Evil differs from the Logical Problem of Evil because it is an inductive argument with a lesser 'burden of proof' - it does not purport a certain conclusion.Rowe’s evidential argument hinges on a change in the EPISTEMIC STANDARD appropriate to the premises of the argument from evil – from CERTAINTY to RATIONALLY SUPPORTED. CERTAINTY is a very high epistemic standard! What can we really be certain about? I can’t say for certain that I’ll be hosting a visit from my parents this weekend, even though I know that’s my plan. RATIONAL SUPPORT, on the other hand, is a more achievable epistemic standard. My belief that I’ll be hosting a visit from my parents this weekend, while not certain, is rationally supported: because I’ve helped make the plans, I trust that my parents will conform to those plans based on past experience of their reliability, and so on. Rowe utilises an inductive argument in which it is thought that the premises provide reasons supporting the probable truth of the conclusion. the premises are intended only to be so strong that, if they are true, then it is unlikely that the conclusion is false. 
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. _______________________________3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. 
As Chisholm identified in his logical analysis of the problem of evil, we can’t be CERTAIN about claims like premise 1. However, Rowe argues that there is abundant EVIDENCE which can RATIONALLY SUPPORT premise 1, such as a dead fawn burnt in a forest fire which lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. This intense, preventable suffering doesn't appear to lead to a greater good and, because the world contains numerous instances of suffering like this, it appears that premise one is true (although it is not certain).

William L. Rowe (1979), ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4): 335-341