While many complex and intertwining factors including the Soviet economy, German mistakes, Lend-Lease aid and the determination of the Soviet people arguably all contributed to Soviet victory over the Wehrmacht in 1945, the most important factor was indeed Stalin’s leadership; without his handling of the war effort, the Great Patriotic War may have been lost. // Despite Stalin’s initial failure to anticipate Hitler’s invasion in June 1941, he began issuing commands from his dacha, centralised decision-making by forming Stavka and the GKO to bypass Soviet bureaucracy, and sacked incompetent generals like Voroshilov to accept the military advice of Zhukov and others. Presenting the war as patriotic rather than a political war for communism, Stalin uncharacteristically appealed to his “comrades, citizens, brothers and sisters” in a rare radio speech on July 3rd to rally the Soviet people in defence of the motherland, made concessions to the Orthodox Church and reassured the people that he would guide them to victory, not leaving Moscow once after returning from his dacha. This psychological propaganda was most successful during the Siege of Leningrad, where Stalin’s ‘not one more step backwards’ order subjected millions to deprivation and death, but crucially saved the cradle of the revolution from the Wehrmacht. Militarily, allowing up-and-coming generals like Vasilevsky to use their initiative was instrumental in ensuring crucial Soviet victories like the ‘Operation Uranus’ counterattack in Stalingrad in 1942, while Stalin’s ‘scorched earth’ policy for the Red Army retreating from the German advance, often assisted by partisans, made it very difficult for the Wehrmacht to press forward on unknown and obliterated soil. Discipline in the Red Army was imposed with an iron fist and deserters were shot, leaving soldiers with little option but to fight. With a huge population used to being regimented at his disposal, Stalin was prepared to win the war at any cost; approximately 25 million Soviet citizens perished in the war effort.
The strengths of the USSR’s economy were crucial to victory, with its huge industrial capacity and Stalin gearing it for Total War from the 1930s onward. Under Stalin’s management, the strict command economy and system of collectivisation made the quick mobilisation of people and resources much easier; 55% of GDP was set aside for military production, restrictions on private plots were lifted to produce food, while 80% of industry factories were relocated further east to protect them. The USSR was soon outproducing Germany across many industries, which became clear during the important 1943 tank battle at Kursk, when superior Soviet tanks and weapons tipped the overall balance in Soviet favour. Although Soviet historians downplay its significance, Lend-Lease aid from the Allied Powers provided another $11.7 billion towards the war effort, which western historians argue accounted for 1/5 of Soviet resources. Still, it must be acknowledged that the remaining 4/5 of Soviet resources were produced by its own economy. // Finally, Stalin was able to capitalise on German mistakes, often exposed in the face of Soviet determination. Fighting a war on two fronts, Hitler delayed Operation Barbarossa by 5 weeks, falling foul of the approaching Russian winter. This, accompanied by Hitler’s underestimation of the Soviet people as ‘untermensch’ and belief that “all we need to do is kick the door in and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down”, led to the failure of Blitzkrieg and saw the Red Army still holding Stalingrad and Leningrad by the end of 1941. The brutality of the Wehrmacht failed to take advantage of the anti-Soviet feelings of alienated Soviet peasants, who had initially seen the Germans as liberators. During the winter of 1941 ¼ million German troops froze to death, and the spring rains of 1942 brought mud that clogged up German wheeled vehicles, but was no issue for Soviet tracked tanks. Unlike Stalin’s trust in military advice from his generals, Hitler had surrounded himself with ‘yes’ men and failed to anticipate the strength of millions of Soviet people forced to fight for their homeland, their families and their way of life. Freeze argues ‘the greatest credit for victory in the war belongs to the Soviet population’. // In conclusion, it was arguably Stalin’s ruthlessness that was most significant in winning the war. Alongside effective military strategies and a centralised economy successfully geared for war, the huge population that could be mobilised and willingly sacrificed under Stalin’s orders ensured that by 1945, the Red Army could march on Berlin and declare victory over Germany.