Provide a brief summary of Donoghue v Stevenson's current role in the law of negligence
Negligence is ‘asking’ where a duty of care, as opposed to liability, exists. In Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Lord Atkin established that a duty of care existed between a manufacturer and their consumers. This duty was established through the “neighbour principle” that the individual “must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour”. However, the decision in Donoghue demonstrated that the categories of negligence are never truly closed; and it was the fear of the dissenting judges that this principle would open the “floodgates” through expanding vicarious liability. Serendipitously, cases in the mid 20th century began to overly expand upon Atkin’s “neighbour principle”, in what was “reasonably foreseeable”. Judgments such as Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] UKHL 2 and Hailey v London Electricity Board [1965] A.C.778 saw an extension of foreseeability based on an excessively broad principle of default liability from careless conduct; as opposed to a gradual widening of specific duties, envisaged by Lord Atkin. More recently, Lord Bridge then re-interpreted the “neighbour principle” in the prominent case of Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1989] 2 A.C. 605. This approach arguably refined the principles of Donoghue, yet equally revitalised them in Lord Bridge’s “three stage test”. The first stage required that it must be reasonably foreseeable that a failure to take reasonable care could cause damage to the claimant; while it is possible to see this as a departure from the overall principle enunciated in Donoghue (see K. Stanton, ‘The Neighbourhood Principle in the 21st Century: Yesterday’s Revolution’ (2012) 20 TLR 61, Robertson aptly recognises its “undeniable synonymy” (see A. Robertson, ‘Justice, Community Welfare and the Duty of Care’ (2011) 127 LQR 370). The second stage, that there must be a relationship of proximity between the parties, clearly draws from the “neighbour principle” in Donoghue. Moreover, the proximity of the parties must be coupled with the harm’s foreseeability. The third stage: that the duty of the defendant not to cause damage to the claimant must be fair, just and reasonable is, admittedly, a departure from Donoghue. This was illustrated in Marc Rich & Co. v. Bishop Rock Marine Co. Ltd [1996] 1 AC 211 in which Lord Lloyd’s dissent: “All that is required is a straightforward application of Donoghue” was corrected by the majority; stating that such an application would create vicarious liability. Accordingly, while deviating from Donoghue in minor criterion, the Caparo ‘test’ continues the application of the “neighbour principle” of Donoghue; developing it away from prior interpretations of default liability by using a cautious policy of incrementalism.
