Russia during the period of 1855-1964 experienced great levels of change in the nature of its government. Under the Tsars and then the Communist leaders of Russia post-1917, it is evident that there are numerous shifts in the levels of repression during the period, the ideological nature of government, and the legitimacy of the ruler leading the government, and in assessing these three themes it is apparent that 1917, and the February Revolution saw the greatest change overall in ideology and repression. Whilst Stalin’s rise to power was indeed a great turning point, it only triggered the greatest change in the nature of government regarding the leader and legitimacy of the leader of government. ‘1917 was the most volatile year in 300 years of Russian history’ (Cohen), and this certainly translates into the greatest change in the nature of government during the period.
With respect to the change in the levels of coercion during the period, the October Revolution was far more significant and a greater turning point than Stalin’s rise to power. In the aftermath of the October Revolution, Lenin’s repressive measures, seen primarily in the grain requisitioning and class discipline under War Communism, was a far greater turning point than Stalin’s rise to power. Whilst Stalin, like Lenin, had increased the levels of repression through collectivisation and dekulakisation (purging 10 million kulaks in the 1920’s), he merely continued the repressive nature of government seen under Lenin, accelerating the scale of censorship and repression of classes. By contrast, under Lenin after the October Revolution, the Russian government was seismically shifted from a position of freedom of press and of speech, free and fair elections of the Constituent Assembly seen under the Provisional Government, which had, unlike any other rule during the period, actively encourage opposition groups, Lenin’s Cheka-dominated political repression was a huge increase in the levels of coercion. With Lenin’s ban on factions in 1917 and subsequent ban on all other Russian parties in 1924, he cemented the repressive nature of his government and exemplifies the dramatic change in the repressive nature of government, unlike any seen across the period despite the intensification of repressive measures like the Great Purges of internal opposition under Stalin in the 1930’s. There are indeed other ‘turning points’ that changed the level of repression during the period however. The 1905 Revolution saw less repressive measures as part of concessions made by Tsar Nicholas II in order to ensure that he was usurped- the free and fair elections, as well as the promise for a strong national duma giving the people more representation were reforms dissimilar to ones made by Alexander III, his predecessor, who had taken away power from the zemstvo and repressed the people under a policy of Russification which saw minorities, like Poles, taught and made to read and write in Russian. This signifies a significant change in the level of repression, yet the size and scope in the changes of levels of repression were unparalleled in the October Revolution; ultimately, Nicholas brought in more repressive measures and exercised great power of the Duma in bringing in the Fundamental Laws of 1906-7, which reversed many manifesto reforms. Nicholas, in a similar way to his grandfather Alexander II, had made concessions in allowing greater representation of the masses and more freedom of press and speech, yet both became more repressive in the later stages of their rules, hence proving why Alexander’s assassination in 1881 was also not a great turning point in the level of coercion; his son, though accelerating repressive measures, continued the same idea of repression of non-elites as his father had done later in life. In assessing all the ‘turning points’ in the levels of coercion during the period, therefore, one can say that whilst many turning points saw an acceleration (seen in Stalin’s rise to power) or deceleration (in the case of Khrushchev and Destalinisation) of their predecessor’s policies, only the October Revolution can be said to have completely altered the attitude toward repressive measures throughout the period; changing the levels of repression under the Provisional Government from virtually none to the highly repressive nature of Lenin’s leadership between 1917 and 1924.