To what extent do public authorities have 'general immunity'?

This paper discusses why public authorities should not hide behind a cloak of immunity and explains the limitations of the justifications provided. Although the traditional blanket immunity for sovereign entities has long been preserved, society is a living organism which evolves and develops. As a matter of policy, public bodies are still treated differently from private citizens. The discussion of curtailing their freedom from tortious liability has generated arguments of unease. Questioning if embracing broader doctrines abandon certainty or lead to public authorities adopting defensive practices. However, the emergence of the policy-operational dichotomy demands an important question. Can the general exclusion principle apply equally to a set of bodies, even though ‘public authority’ lacks a coherent definition? Public authorities should not have general immunity from liability, it engenders great social injustice and the emergence of unconvincing rules can no longer excuse the awkward jurisprudence of the courts. First, it should be considered whether public authorities have ‘general immunity’. The ambit of general immunity stems from Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire. Lord Keith underlined two grounds for exempting police liability, the former relating to the absence of a ‘special relationship’ referred to as ‘proximity’ and the latter concerning public policy . ‘Immunity’ can also be provided using the omissions principle. As the etymology of public bodies is tenuous, can a general exclusionary standard be applied equally to a set of bodies lacking a singular definition?