What constitutes Republican Democratic Theory (RDT)

Modern republican thought, with the help of a growing number of discovered ancient Greek texts, began developing during renaissance Italy . Marsilius in his Defensor pacis, proposed the notion that the source of legitimate political authority lies with ‘the people’ (45). This radical concept sought to entrench the notion that the direction of a community ought to follow the will of those who form it. By locating sovereignty in the will of the people, Marcillius helped construct one of the most fundamental aspects of Republican thought. Indeed, Marcilius’ contribution to RDT was most profoundly explored and defended by Rousseau who stressed the importance of the ‘general will’ which must be identified through a process of deliberation where citizens introspectively seek the common good for the community. Importantly, this notion of the ‘general will’ is quite distinct and separate from the liberal conception of the ‘will of all’ or the aggregate of individual interests and desires. What was of the upmost importance for Rousseau, and indeed for RDT, is that the general community must come together with individuals searching inside of themselves to find what is best for the community as a whole. The significance of this point can only be fully elucidated through the context of the Republican notion of freedom. Rousseau argued that due to the socialising stages of human interaction and the early social contracts, the human being’s natural freedom has necessarily been lost. For Rousseau, the purpose of a good state is to exchange this old freedom for civil freedom; the only type left available for the modern man. Civil freedom is the conception of citizens being in control of their community’s decisions. Thus, Rousseau proposed that the creation of a legitimate state, one which followed the general will of the people, was the only means for the modern person to be free. This conception of freedom has been pejoratively labelled by Berlin as ‘positive freedom’, the freedom to self-master oneself. Indeed, Habermas argues that the classical republican notion of freedom “guarantee…the possibility of participating in a common practice, through which the citizens can first make themselves into what they want to be – politically responsible subjects of a community of free and equal citizens” (Habermas 1998). However, this conception of Republican freedom has been challenged by Pettit (1997) who convincingly demonstrates that a more accurate labelling of republican liberty is the freedom to not be dominated by an individual or agency without having some voice over its decision-making process. The political process of decision-making, which encompasses both the actual vote and the manner in which the debate is discussed, is such that every person has a chance to influence the outcome and have faith that the decision, even if not their first choice, is in some sense their decision. Thus for RDT, the notion that self-rule is an end in itself means that democracy, through its collective self-determination, is inherently good. The right set of procedures can guarantee citizens the ability to avoid domination and thus the ability to achieve civil freedom.

Citizens ought to decide upon the future of the collective group based upon what they take to be the best decision for the collective. Thus, RDT stress the necessity in a democracy for individuals to have the ability to identify the common good and create laws which are both general in scope and origin. RDT stresses that public affairs should not just be a state, but rather the formation of a type of society: a society in which the affairs of the state are integrated into the affairs of ordinary citizens. Machiavelli highlighted the importance for civic involvement. Political participation is a necessary condition for liberty, “a self-governing republic requires involvement in the political process” (Held 43). Thus for RDT, the public sphere and civil society represent an important significance; not only are they crucial for the integration of citizen’s and the deliberation of the general will, but through their continuation they actually represent the sustenance of liberty.