Was Chamberlain's conference in Munich a triumph or diaster?

I find it best to present this question in the form of a list or mindmap. I have an example I can show you, although I recommend you make your own as we go along.

Firstly, how was Munich a triumph?

The biggest point to draw from this is that ultimately Chamberlain got what he wanted from the conference, not Hitler. The second point to stress is that Munich postponed the outbreak of war in 1938, a war Britain was not ready for. The extra year of peace allowed Britain to develop the spitfire and the British Expeditionary Force. None of Britain's allies were ready for war either, France still had an entirely defensive strategy. The public were not ready for a war either. Lastly, there was no moral case at this time for the outbreak of war; Germany had not claimed any non-German territory at this time, the Sudetenland was already agreed to be transferred to Germany.

However, the conference was not perfect! How was Munich a disaster for British foreign policy?

Despite the agreements at Munich, Hitler, unsurprisingly, still invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia just 6 months after the conference. The loss of Czechoslovakia was equivalent to losing 35 armed divisions. Additionally, the Skoda arms factory (the most productive war factory at this time) was lost to the German's in the invasion. This proved that Chamberlain was wrong about Hitler and his word could not be trusted. Distrust in Hitler was supported by 86% of the British population who feared Munich would be a waste of time and more than the Sudetenland would be lost. Furthermore, Hitler actually saved himself from assassination by compromising at Munich, as his advisors did not think Germany was ready for war. In the years following Munich, it was realised that German armed forces were not as advanced as GB had initially believed. Additionally, the USSR was preparing for war, meaning Germany would have to fight a war on two fronts. All of this would have given Britain a significant advantage and potential to defeat Germany as early as 1939.

From this I ask you to draw your own conclusion about whether Munich was a triumph or disaster. Consider and prioritise each factor from the outcome in relation to Britain's strategic position in 1938. Personally, I would have to call Munich a triumph for British foreign policy in this period, as much significant progress for war was made in the year of peace.